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It’s done. Can it be stopped?
Can the law pull the plug on cybercrime?

GETTING AWAY WITH

B

Maybe. Maybe not.
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ank robbers used to be famous: Bonnie and Clyde, Willie
Sutton, John Dillinger. … They were fodder for headlines
and the inspiration for movies.
Today, cybercriminals prefer to loot your bank account anonymously — on a scale undreamed of by the
gun-toting gangsters of yesteryear.
Bank robbers and cybercriminals do have in common a love of technological improvements. In the 1930s,
before the expansion of federal law enforcement, one
could rob a bank in one state and simply drive into the
next to elude arrest. Clyde Barrow wrote to Henry Ford
thanking him for his automobiles that made eluding
police so easy.
Today — as students learn in the Cybersecurity and
National Security Law class of Susan Brenner, Samuel A.
McCray Chair in Law — cybercriminals continue to use
technology to stay a step (or two) ahead of the law.
“Until this class,” Cristina Frankian ’14 said, “I didn’t
realize what an issue cybersecurity is. I didn’t realize how
complicated it is.”
That complexity — technological, geographical and
legal — presents the legal system, corporations and private citizens a problem that must be confronted, whether
through changes in law, enhanced law enforcement or
better defenses on the part of potential victims.
Cybercrime seems almost to have been born by accident. Early in the computer age, hacking was like a game.
Brenner, in her 2010 book Cybercrime: Criminal Threats
from Cyberspace, wrote of MIT in the 1970s when one’s
computer might flash “Give me a cookie,” raising fears of
lost work. But typing “cookie” would yield a thank you;
and not doing anything, “I didn’t want a cookie anyway.”
No harm, no foul?
As computers became linked through larger networks and through the explosion of personal computers, hacking became more widespread. And hackers
morphed into two groups: brilliant programmers and
computer criminals. By the end of the 1990s, the problem was serious. On May 4, 2000, computers around
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Right, Susan Brenner is framed behind a bank of
computers in the main campus data center.

the world received an email with the subject line
ILOVEYOU and an attachment LOVE-LETTER-FORYOU.TXT. Once it was opened, Brenner said, it
emailed itself to everyone in that person’s address book.
And the process repeated and repeated and repeated.
The so-called Love Bug destroyed files as it infected 45
million computers in at least 20 countries and caused
$8 billion to 10 billion in damage.
The bug was traced to the Philippines, but no one
was convicted of a crime. In 2000, the Philippines had no
law against creating and spreading a computer virus.
Soon, the original creators of such malware were
joined by others who had as their motive not just destruction but substantial profit. The malware business
produces an estimated annual income of more than
$100 billion. And it’s generally a legal business. Laws
prohibit the use of malware but not its creation. Its use,
however, is often not reported. For example, if one is
running an online casino that could lose millions if its
servers were shut down by an attack, one could see wisdom in paying $2,000 a month for “protection.”
Part of the difficulty in arresting and prosecuting
perpetrators of cybercrime is analogous to those state
boundaries that helped bank robbers of the past motor
across state lines. Cybercrime is relatively new; quickly
changing technology gives criminals new tools and opportunities. Law, however, changes slowly. And it is not
a simple thing. The United States alone has 52 sets of
laws (the states, the federal government, the District of
Columbia).
And, Frankian said, “just look at the Homeland
Security site, how many agencies are working on cybersecurity. That creates an overlap of work and a lack of
communication. It’s inefficient.”
And a hacker can be anywhere on earth. And Earth
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has 193 countries. Maybe. The United
Nations does have 193 members. The U.S.
Department of State recognizes 195 nations.
FIFA, the governing body of soccer, has 209
national associations. Disagreements about
sovereignty, jurisdiction and what constitutes crime are commonplace — making
prosecuting attacks on computers difficult.
Computers don’t make just good targets
for crimes; they are also very useful tools

After the confusion turned into a case,
one of the sisters wrote to Brenner — who
had blogged about it. The sisters were
terrified.
The resolution of the case? Because the
accused, Brenner said, “did not direct any of
his activity toward either victim, he did not
commit the crime of harassment.” Under
a negotiated deal, he pled guilty to a lesser
charge, was sentenced to 30 days and a year’s

Will Cristina Frankian ’14, who interned with a federal magistrate, have the tools when she
goes into practice to take on cybercriminals?

themselves for committing traditional ones
such as fraud, harassment and even murder.
Some crimes would seem simple to avoid —
don’t withdraw your savings when you get
an email from Nigeria. But many people do.
Victims in the United States have lost hundreds of millions of dollars; the amount is
estimated because most victims don’t report
the crime to police.
Those wishing to stalk or harass others
have found computers to be a powerful
tool. And one that challenges legal descriptions of certain crimes. For example, two
sisters, ages 28 and 16, were churchgoers
in an Indiana town. Unknown to them,
a man who worked at the church created
Facebook pages in their names. He posted
their photos, addresses, phone numbers and
after-school activities. He used the pages to
have virtual sex with men around the world.
After two years, the church’s pastor — about
to move on to a new post — was compiling information for his successor about his
congregation.
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probation while receiving counseling. He
had to surrender his computer.
Connecting the substantial damage
caused by cybercrime to a perpetrator is
often difficult if not impossible. Brenner
considered the case of Aaron Caffrey, who
lived in England with his parents. A chat
room user made anti-American comments
against Caffrey’s online American girlfriend.
An attack was launched from Caffrey’s
computer upon the computer of the person
making the perceived insult.
The attack had a large incidental effect.
Just nine days after the terrorist attacks of
9/11, the computer system of the Port of
Houston — a system essential for navigating
ships in and out of the world’s eighth busiest
harbor — was shut down by an external
computer attack.
Caffrey did not contest that the attack came from his computer. The defense
claimed that, although his computer
launched the attack, he did not. “Someone”
must have installed malicious software that

took over the computer without his knowledge and then erased all traces of it. He was
acquitted.
Often a crime committed across borders
does not even come to trial. “A U.S. arrest
warrant,” Brenner wrote, “is worthless in any
other country, in the same way that a French
warrant has no effect in the United States.”
There are, she noted, formal devices to
obtain evidence from other countries, such
as letters rogatory, treaty requests and requests for assistance under executive agreements. Letters rogatory, however, can take
years. Requests under a mutual assistance
treaty are faster but still can take months or
longer. Assistance under executive agreements, which do not have to be approved by
Congress, have been used primarily to stem
narcotics trafficking; they are unlikely to
be used for attacking cybercrime. Informal
cooperation is faster although dependent
upon networks of individuals willing to aid
each other.
Even if evidence is gathered, bringing the accused to trial can be difficult. A
country with an extradition treaty with
another may be reluctant to give up one of
its citizens to be prosecuted for a crime that
may not be seen as serious when it occurs
somewhere else. And a country without an
extradition treaty has no legal obligation.
For an example of how complex a situation can be, Brenner pointed to the Rome
Labs case. The Rome Air Force Development Center at Griffiss Air Force Base in
New York serves as, in the words of a Senate
report, “the Air Force’s premier command
and control research facility.” In the mid1990s, hackers installed programs on the
labs’ networks and collected passwords,
suggesting that they could access the labs’
databases. Four weeks of investigation followed a cybertrail through South Africa,
Mexico and European countries before finding in London one of the two perpetrators: a
16-year-old music student. Two more years
of work led to the 21-year-old son of a police
officer. The 16-year-old, prosecuted in England, pled guilty to 12 counts of violating the
Computer Misuse Act. Charges against the
other were dropped.
A more recent case illustrates the difficulty when a cybercrime originates in a
country with which the U.S. does not have
an extradition treaty. Hackers broke into
the systems of 40 U.S. companies, including
banks, and tried to coerce the companies
into hiring them as “security consultants.”
One company responded by hiring its

own cybercriminals to counterattack; the
counterattack failed as it was deflected into
an attack on the other companies. Another
company refused to pay the $500,000 “consulting fee.” Its website was knocked offline.
The company went to the FBI, which suggested drawing out negotiations with the
hackers. One of the hackers, in an apparent
attempt to land a job, sent his resume. That
incautious act helped the FBI trace the
source of the attack to Russia, with whom
the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty.
Russia ignored requests that it detain
the hacker. So, he and a partner were
invited to come to the U.S. for a job interview. They did and gladly demonstrated
their hacking skills; this allowed the FBI to
record their work, gaining access to their
Russian server. They were arrested. The two
argued their Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated since the FBI did not have a
search warrant. A federal judge, however,
ruled the search took place in Russia, the
site of the server, not in the U.S., so the
Fourth Amendment did not apply. The two
went to jail.
Russia requested that the FBI agent be
surrendered for prosecution in Russia. According to Brenner, “the United States has
apparently never responded.”
What other options did the FBI have?
Kidnapping is a legal, though hardly
practical, option, Brenner noted. An 1886
Supreme Court ruling, recently upheld,
said “the power of a court to try a person
for crime is not impaired by the fact that he
had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’”
Law enforcement has serious problems
in its attempts to counter cybercrime. Law
and law enforcement evolve. Technology
changes faster.
For millennia before the creation of
the Metropolitan Police in 19th-century
London and its descendants worldwide, policing was the work of either the military or
of amateurs. In England over the centuries,
a “hue and cry” aroused the citizenry to
pursue a criminal. Over time experiments
were made with private police forces until
in 1829 Sir Robert Peel created the London
Metropolitan Police. That model remains
today.
But it was created with assumptions
that fall apart in cyber reality. It assumes
real-world crime, which Brenner pointed
out, by being committed in a tangible
physical environment, has four characteristics: proximity, scale, physical constraints,

Privacy, anyone?
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated …
Then, one might ask, “Why does it seem
like everybody on earth can read my email?”
The Fourth Amendment may be the
same as it was in the 18th century, but the
world is different. So what is the state now of
the right of Americans against unreasonable
search and seizure?
Susan Brenner, in her book, Cybercrime:
Criminal Threats from Cyberspace, summarized the history of the application of the
Fourth Amendment and looked at issues
presented by cyber-reality.
Until the 15th century in England, government searches of private property were,
Brenner wrote, almost unknown. In the late
15th century, some guilds were authorized to
search private property to enforce their regulations. A century later, the Court of the Star
Chamber gained the authority to search and
to seize books unlawfully printed. Heretics
and political dissenters as well as printers
became targets.
In the 18th century, courts became more
likely to side with the citizens, and an Englishman’s home did become more like a castle.
That an exception seemed to be made for
citizens residing in the American colonies was
a cause of both revolution and the adoption of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. For a century, American courts
had little trouble in applying the amendment;
it obviously applied to searches of people
and places.
In 1876, Congress passed a law to protect
people from being defrauded by crooked lotteries using the U.S. mail. A citizen challenged
the constitutionality of the law. He lost, but
the Supreme Court did hold that sealed mail
(as distinct from items such as newspapers)
was fully guarded from inspection “as if they
were retained by the parties forwarding them
in their own domiciles.”
Also in 1876, Alexander Graham Bell
invented the telephone. Soon police began

and patterns. It’s hard to physically attack
or physically rob somebody who is halfway around the world. Real-world crime is
often on an old-fashioned one-to-one basis.
Real-world crime occurs in a specific place;
the criminal has to be familiar with it, often

tapping phones; this was seen — since
calls went through an operator — as akin to
reading someone’s postcard, not opening a
sealed letter. By the 1920s, however, operators were replaced by automated systems.
Roy Olmstead, a convicted bootlegger, appealed because wiretap evidence was used
to convict him. A Supreme Court majority
upheld the conviction; the man’s home had
not been entered.
Justice Louis Brandeis dissented. “He
was able to grasp,” Brenner wrote, “the
significance of the new technology.”
Brandeis wrote: “The progress of science
in furnishing the government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may … be developed by which
the government, without removing papers
from secret drawers, can reproduce them
in court, and by which it will be enabled to
expose … the most intimated occurrences of
the home. … That places the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer.”
In 1965 the Supreme Court overturned
the Olmstead decision. A 1979 decision,
however, ruled that the government could
use devices to record phone numbers a person calls and numbers from which calls come
to that person. Justice Thurgood Marshall
dissented, as does professor Brenner.
Then came email.
It’s not like a letter. Unless one encrypts
email (and, Brenner notes, few do outside
of the military and intelligence communities), email is treated as a postcard. Since
the same technology that scans for spam
and obscenity can scan for other content,
the government, employers and others can
have easy access to the content of email.
The government would need a court order
or subpoena. Employers can generally just
rely on employees to click “I agree” on email
policies. And the material in the “to” and
“from” fields and the data generated as the
email is transmitted have no Fourth Amendment protection whatsoever.
The Internet is not one’s physical castle.
And its legal bulwarks are an evolving field.

has to be there. And much real-world crime
is tracked because criminals repeat actions;
they have patterns.
Cybercrime is automated. “Perpetrators,” Brenner wrote, “can commit thousands of crimes quickly and with little ef-
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Awaiting attack

fort.” And with little regard
“Companies work
to boundaries.
with others,” she said,
“This is a very complaWith law enforcement
“essentially cybercent
country,” Susan Brenner
response to cybercrime,
mercenaries who could
said. “Europe is not. They’ve
Frankian said, “there is no
counterattack. But an
been attacked, invaded and
time for strategy or analy‘eye-for-an-eye’ could
bombed by neighbors. We’ve
sis. An attack can come
become cyberwar.”
gotten used to being bordered
from anywhere. And you
That’s partly because
by Mexico and Canada.”
don’t see it coming.”
finding the target can
And having a big ocean
At the same time,
be difficult. The hacker
on
each
side and the world’s
“cybercrime has not
in the Rome Labs
most powerful air force
altered people’s inclinacase, Brenner pointed
overhead can also bolster our
tion,” Brenner wrote, “to
out, “routed his attack
feeling of security.
rape, rob or kill in the
through a North Korean
Brenner does not worry, however, about the country being physireal world.” Added to
nuclear facility. Hacking
cally invaded but about its citizens being the victims of cyberattacks
the increased quantity of
back would have attacked
launched by criminals, often from the security of havens in rogue states.
crimes are enforcement
that.”
“It’s amazing how vulnerable we are,” said Aaron Wiener ’14 (picdifficulties peculiar to
Frankian, in her
tured above), a student this past fall in Susan Brenner’s Cybersecurity
cybercrime. The police
research this past term,
and National Security Law class. “Security is expensive, and the threat is
often aren’t involved
looked at an alternative
not perceived.”
until well after the crime
to counterattack: empowEven before entering UDSL, however, Wiener began trying to spread
is committed and the trail
ering the government to
awareness of the threat and do something to improve defenses against it.
has become cold. Evidence
help companies establish
“Accountants often send unsecured email and faxes,” he said, “an
is fragile and volatile. And
a good defense. She
identity thief ’s dream come true.”
the hesitancy to report cyenvisions the possibility
Wiener, who was a communication major at the University of Illibercrime makes establishof an overarching federal
nois, joined forces with friends who were knowledgeable about accounting patterns different.
agency not only to reguing to found DocPalApp.com, an application that provides accountants
What can be done?
late, she said, but also “to
a secure way to transmit documents. He hopes that the app having been
Brenner noted that
reach out to businesses,
developed specifically for accountants will give it a market edge over
efforts have been made
financial institutions and
more generic devices.
by several organizations.
utilities to see where they
Whatever method accountants or other business people choose, “we
International studies of
are vulnerable, to see
have to say to citizens,” Brenner said, “protect yourselves. And a lot of
cybercrime have been
what they need in case of
businesses are coming to realize this.”
done since the 1980s. The
cyberattack.”
Council of Europe drafted
Such an approach
a cybercrime treaty to
may not be as grand a
harmonize national laws. The United Naplan as rewriting laws in some 200 nations
Some solutions offered to combat cytions passed a resolution. The G8 and other
or hiring bands of mercenary hackers, but
bercrime do not focus on the law. Frankian
groups of nations have called for consistent
as Brenner wrote, “Encouraging cybercrime
this year did research on cyberdefense. The
laws.
prevention is not a particularly exciting
option of offensive measures (“hacking
But because of nations’ concerns for
strategy, but it would probably make cyberback”), though illegal, has recently gained
their sovereignty, it is unlikely they will
criminals’ lives more difficult [and] it could
momentum and is supported by U.S.
cede power to a central policing agency.
increase the effectiveness of law enforcecompanies who have been the victims of
INTERPOL, for example, has a cybercrime
ment efforts.”
destructive and costly cyberattacks.
initiative but focuses on supporting law
enforcement at the national level.
A treaty, the Convention on CyberFor further reading
crime, was in 2001 presented to countries
Students set up a fake social media account in the name of their assistant principal. They use
for ratification. By the time of Brenner’s
the account to invite children to communicate with, the children think, the assistant principal. The
2010 book, it had been signed by 46 counchildren are then bombarded with porn.
tries and ratified by 20, the United States
The assistant principal sues in federal court.
and 19 European countries. Russia refused
He loses.
to sign it. And many countries aren’t just
After all, the judge noted, even Facebook admitted that nearly 10 percent of its users were “dupassively opposed; some operate like the
plicates, false or undesirable.”
island havens for sea-going pirates of the
The assistant principal “can presumably try suing in state court,” Susan Brenner wrote in her blog
1600s. Having your nation’s banking operaCYB3RCRIM3 (cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com), where she has analyzed that case and hundreds of others in
tions secret may not be something pleasdetail.
ing to other nations — but it can be very
Brenner, Samuel A. McCray Chair in Law, has also published several books and journal articles on
profitable.
cybercrime (see www.udayton.edu/directory/law/brenner_susan.php).
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